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To some, adoption is the act of adoption-the legal moment in the
courthouse.
To some it is the life of adoption that the adopted child lives.
To some it is the life of adoption that the adoptive parents live.
To some it is the life of adoption that the birth parents live.
To some it is the adoptive family, inclusive of the child.
To some it is the extended family of adoption, including the birth
parents (whether they are known or unknown, present or not).
To a child, adoption is about being with the family they are in.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

N 1994 James and Patricia Pilkington, a suburban Detroit couple,
2
took a young boy into their home and cared for him like a son.
Early in 1998, three-and-a-half years later, the Pilkingtons began a
fight to keep the child, suing the Metro Detroit social service agency and
claiming that their efforts to adopt the child have been impeded by racial3
preferences of social workers and a bias against transracial adoption.
The service defends on the ground that the biological mother still has
parental rights, and points out4 that the agency's transracial adoption rate
exceeds the national average.
1. JOYCE MAGUIRE PAVAO, THE FAMILY OF ADOPTION 125 (1998) (emphasis
added).
2. See David Josar, Couple's Lawsuit Stirs Controversy over Merits of Mixed-Race
Adoption, THE DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 20, 1998.
3. This term generally refers to the adoption of a child whose ethnic background
differs from that of the adoptive parent(s). See Barbara McLaughlin, Comment, Trans-

racialAdoption in New York State, 60

ALB. L. REV. 501,502 (1996); see also OWEN GILL &
BARBARA JACKSON, ADOPTION AND RACE: BLACK, ASIAN AND MIXED RACE CHILDREN

IN WHITE FAMILIES 1 (1983) ("In the overwhelming majority of cases this means white

parents adopting black or mixed-race children."). But see Department of Health and
Human Services, Answers to GAO Questions Regarding the Multiethnic PlacementAct, as
Amended (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/policy/im9803a.
htm> [hereinafter Answers] ("The Department of Health and Human Services does not
classify placements as being 'inracial' or 'transracial."'). Throughout this Comment, I will
use the terms "interethnic adoption" and "transracial adoption" interchangeably.
4. See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 502. According to the National Association of
Black Social Workers, commonly referred to as NABSW, the national average of transracial adoptions is 3.6% of all adoptions. See id. However, getting accurate statistics on
SHIRLEY C.
SAMUELS, IDEAL ADOPTION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO FORMING AN ADOPTIVE FAMILY 18 (1990) (citing lapses in record-keeping as a reason for lack of accurate figures).

adoption is difficult because they are more "approximations than realities."

Since 1994, all states have been required under The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis
and Reporting System (AFCARS) to collect case-specific data on all children in foster care

for whom the state child welfare agency has responsibility for placement, care, or supervision. States must collect data on all adopted children placed by a child welfare agency or a
private agency in contract with the child welfare agency. Further, states are encouraged to
report on other adoptions finalized in that state. All reports are made semi-annually. See
Foster Care and Adoption Statistics Current Reports (last modified July 30, 1997) <http://
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/stats/afcars/index.htm> (information supplied by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services with only 19 states reporting for the period
between April 1, 1996, through September 30, 1996).
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This story is just another example of how the debate over transracial
adoption continues despite efforts by the United States Congress and individual state legislatures to halt prejudice in the area of family and adoption law. 5 It may even represent what some would call a loophole: a way
for adoption agencies to use the pretext of keeping a family together to
continue a long-standing tradition of race-matching in both the public
and private adoption spheres.
The debate over transracial adoption has been stirring for almost two
decades and has been the subject of many academic essays, as well as
newspaper articles and stories in local news. 6 Unfortunately, because the
debate centers on the emotionally charged topics of race and family, and
5. See Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103382, 551-554, 108 Stat. 4056, 4056-57 [hereinafter MEPA] (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1996(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994)); Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of
1996, in the Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 1808(c), 110 Stat.
1755, 1904 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b)) [hereinafter Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption] (also referred to as section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act
of 1996, entitled "Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption" according to the Office
for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). Both acts are
collectively known as the MEPA and the Interethnic Adoption Provisions ("MEPA-IEP").
The MEPA-IEP was recently incorporated into a Final Rule effective March 27, 2000, as
part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Rules and Regulations. See
Administration on Children, Youth and Families (ACYF), Administration for Children
and Families (ACF), and Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), FinalRule,
65 Fed. Reg. 4020 (2000) [hereinafter Final Rule].
6. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998) (arguing
that state-based "facilitative accommodation" or framing the choice of a child in terms of
race for adoptive parents leads to racial preferences that systematically produce racial inequality in contemporary American society); Elizabeth Bartholet, Correspondence, Private
Race Preferences in Family Formation, 107 YALE, L.J. 2351 (1998) (reviewing R. Richard
Banks, The Color of Desire: FulfillingAdoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 108 YALE L.J. 875 (1998)); Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard,59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984); Cynthia
R. Mabry, "Love Alone is Not Enough!" in Transracial Adoptions-Scrutinizing Recent
Statutes, Agency Policies,and Prospective Adoptive Parents,42 WAYNE L. REv. 1347 (1996)
(predicting that the original MEPA racial classifications would have survived a strict scrutiny analysis and should not have been repealed, and examining why race continues to be a
critical factor in the adoption context); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion,29 J. F m. L. 51 (1990) (identifying a more structured framework in which to consider race, as opposed to the "discretionary" best interests
rule); Jo Beth Eubanks, Comment, TransracialAdoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests
Standard Be Color-Blind?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1225 (1993) (recognizing the then-current
need for the Texas legislature to adopt a prohibition on race matching in order to satisfy
the "best interests of the child" standard); Vanessa Blum, Race Still Guides Chicago Adoptions, Guardian Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16, 1998 (reporting on the Cook County public
guardian's testimony to House Ways and Means Committee members); Leslie Doty Hollingsworth, Promoting Same-Race Adoption for Children of Color, 43 SoC. WORK 104
(Mar. 1, 1998), available in 1998 WL 15542011; James Rainey, Adoption Push Helps Many
but Has Critics, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at Metro, Al.; Quintin Robinson,
State Ends Racial Preference in Adoption, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Feb. 4, 1998
(discussing Tennessee's legislative elimination of preference for placing children with families of the same race in most adoption cases); Editorial, The Colorblind Love of Adoptive
Families, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Sept. 27, 1998 (discussing the anger of
lawmakers who recognize the continuing practices of race-matching in adoption in spite of
the MEPA, including the original bill sponsor, former Ohio Senator Howard
Metzenbaum).
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affords room for very little middle ground, it is far from over and can
hardly be easily resolved when racial prejudices are still deeply ingrained
in the U.S. social pattern. It is a fact that minority children are less likely
to be adopted; they spend twice the amount of time in foster care awaiting adoption than do Caucasian children, averaging five years total. And
it is true that many parents are more than willing to go overseas to adopt
children in order to avoid dealing with the adoption services provided in
this country.
The debate centers on color, rather than the child. Should an AfricanAmerican child, for example, be placed with white parents at all? What if
those parents have provided a foster home for that child? What if the
parents have never in their lives experienced discrimination because of
the color of their skin? How will they possibly relate to and raise a child
aware of the prejudice that will surround him or her throughout life?
And, most importantly, is it realistically possible to take race out of the
equation in an adoption or foster care situation? More often than not,
the focus of the participants in this discussion is shifted from the ultimate
goal-to provide a stable, loving environment for a growing number of
children legally available 7 for adoption 8-to a debate focused on and promoted by racial politics. R. Richard Banks discussed this model of racial
politics in a recent article:
I propose that facilitative adoption and race matching are typical of
the race-based claims of whites and blacks, respectively. The racebased claims of whites are typically colorblind while those of blacks
are often race-conscious. The race-and-adoption controversy thus
suggests a model of race politics in which race-based claims
predominate, but in which the race-based claims of whites are not
perceived as being race-based. Our asymmetrical identification of
race-based claims produces a cycle of race politics in which the racebased claims of blacks appear ever more illegitimate for transgressing the colorblind ideal, while the race-based, but ostensibly colorblind claims of whites appear even more commendable and
7. See Banks, supra note 6, at 898 (describing the two-stage adoption process: "First,
there must be a termination of the parental rights of the child's biological parents. The
termination can either be voluntary (e.g., where the parent willingly relinquishes the child
for adoption) or involuntary (e.g., where a child is removed from the home due to abuse or
neglect.) Second, parental rights must be legally vested in the adoptive parents. Both steps
require a judicial proceeding.").
8. The statistics are grim. According to the NABSW, "Nationally, about 500,000 children are in foster care and 30,000 to 50,000 are eligible for adoption .... About 20,000 of
those awaiting adoption are black." See Robinson, supra note 6. The "best interests of the
child" standard had long been used by both the adoption agencies and the courts in deciding where to place children available for adoption. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) ("best interests of the child" standard cited as a compelling governmental interest

under a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis); Drummond v. Fulton County
Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 910 (invalidating a state statute that made it illegal for a white family to adopt a child
having mixed black and white parentage) ("This rule contemplates a presumption that the
best interests of the child lie with the natural parent, but that this presumption may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.").
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politically legitimate. 9
For a short time, the original Multiethnic Placement Act (the
"MEPA") passed by Congress in 1994 permitted states to consider race
and ethnicity in selecting a foster care or adoptive home, but they were
restricted from making this determination based solely on race, color, or
ethnic origin. 10 In 1996, Congress utilized a section of the Small Business
and Job Protection Act to amend the MEPA, making it illegal to consider
race when placing a child in a foster or adoptive home, except in rare
circumstances. 1 Unfortunately, the struggle to reconcile race and adoption continues today, over two years later, and is far from resolved.
Part II of this Comment will briefly discuss the history of transracial
adoption. I will comment on the process of adoption as well as the standard of review that the United States Supreme Court uses in evaluating
racial classifications.' 2 This will include a look into Equal Protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitutional implications in
using race as a factor in the selection of adoptive parents. In Part III, I
will outline the social policy arguments advanced by supporters and opponents of interethnic adoption, and explain the provisions of the original
MEPA as well as the Department of Health and Human Services guidance that accompanied the legislation. Part IV will focus on the amendments to the MEPA in 1996 and the lack of guidance supporting the
legislation. In Part V, I will provide a synopsis of testimony given to the
House Ways and Means Committee 13 from various individuals who have
a personal and professional interest in the effective implementation of
this legislation. Part VI is a conclusion with suggestions for effective implementation of the MEPA.
I will argue that although it is illegal to consider race in the placement
of children in both foster and adoptive homes, it is realistically impossible
to take race out of the equation, and it is arguably constitutional to consider race in adoption decisions. My argument will highlight the loopholes in the MEPA which grant broad discretion to social workers in
adoption placement cases. In addition, an extensive lack of Department
of Health and Human Services practical guidance for this legislation
poses problems for healthy implementation; therefore, the MEPA's 1996
replacement has had little effect thus far. In fact, race-matching is still
very alive in the public adoption process, and it will take much more than
a piece of legislation to correct that.
9. Banks, supra note 6, at 927-28.
10. See MEPA, supra note 5 (sometimes referred to as the "Metzenbaum Act").
11. See Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption, supra note 5; see also S. Rep.
No. 104-279, at 5-6 (1996) (citing reasons for amendment: "The Committee is concerned
that [the MEPA of 1996] was not having the intended effect of facilitating the adoption of
minority children .

. .

. [because] it lacked an enforcement provision backed by serious

penalties. As a result, the law was ineffective in promoting the best interests of children by
decreasing the length of time they wait to be adopted.").
12. The U.S. Supreme Court has never issued an opinion on the MEPA or its effects.
13. Testimony was heard by the Subcommittee on Human Resources of U.S. House
Committee on Ways and Means on September 15, 1998.
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HISTORY AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A.

BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN
THE UNITED STATES

Transracial adoption has a short history in the United States. The first
interethnic adoption occurred in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1948 when
an African-American child was adopted by a white couple.14 There was
an increase in transracial adoption in the 1950s and '60s as a result of two
major factors: the large influx of Asian-American children into the
United States, 15 and the civil rights movement.' 6 The second of these two
factors, the civil rights movement, promoted desegregation in America's
public schools and began to open America's eyes to the real barriers between the black and white races, as well as the process of transracial
adoption. 17 "As the nation became more aware of the plight of children
trapped in foster care, transracial adoptions, which numbered only 733 in
1968, rose to an all-time high of 2574 in 1971. Between 1960 and 1976,
there were more than 12,000 recorded transracial adoptions in the United
States."' 8
But the initial success of transracial adoption would not last long. In
1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers ("NABSW")
published a position paper calling the practice of transracial adoption
"genocide" because it did not promote the interests and well-being of
African-American children:
[W]e have taken the position that Black children should be placed
only with Black families whether in foster care or adoption. Black
children belong, physically, psychologically and culturally in Black
families in order that they receive the total sense of themselves and
develop a sound projection of their future. Human beings are a
product of their environment and develop their own sense of values,
attitudes, and self concept within their family structures. Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of
themselves as Black people.
Our position is based on:
14. See JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDA67 (Anchor Books ed. 1978).
15. See Information About the Controversy: TransracialAdoption (visited Oct. 1, 1998)
<http://www.msu.edu/user/badenama/index4.html>. "Children from war-torn countries
without families were adopted by families in the United States. Korean children,
Vietnamese children, and European children were placed with Caucasian parents. As
more and more racial ethnic minority children within the United States were without families, domestic adoption agencies began to place [the children] with Caucasian families who
wanted children." Id.
16. See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 507.
17. See Hollingsworth, supra note 6 ("In the 1960s, widespread use of artificial birth
control, the legalization of abortion, and decreased social stigma associated with bearing a
child outside of marriage were accompanied by a substantial decrease in healthy white
infants available for adoption. There was, however, no corresponding decrease among AfRIES

rican American and other children of color . . .

18. McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 507-08.
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The necessity of self-determination from birth to death, of all Black
people.
The need of our young ones to begin at birth to identify with all
Black people in a Black community.
The philosophy that we need our own to build a strong nation....
This is impossible if the child is placed with white parents in a white
environment. 19
After publication of this position paper, both state and private adoption agencies began implementing provisions in their procedures to promote race-matching, in the "best interests" of the children. Anyone
could have predicted the results: "[o]ne year after the NABSW's pro'20
nouncement, transracial placements decreased by thirty-nine percent.
For example, in Texas before 1967, state statute prohibited the practice
of transracial adoption: "[n]o white child can be adopted by a negro person, nor can a negro child by adopted by a white person. 2 1 This statute,
22
however, was struck down as violative of both the Texas Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 23 in In re Adoption of Gomez. 24 In fact, Texas was the second-to-last state in the United
States to strike down legislation of this kind.2 5 But despite the affirmative
19. NATIONAL ASs'N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, PRESERVING AFRICAN-AMERICAN
FAMILIES, POSITION PAPER (1972) [hereinafter NABSW, POSITION PAPER], quoted in Ma-

bry, supra note 6, at 1352-53. According to Mabry, the NABSW recently revised its position in 1996, stating that transracial adoptions should be considered only after review of
evidence by "appropriate representatives from the African-American community." NATIONAL Ass'N OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, THE CASE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES (1996).

20. Mabry, supra note 6, at 1353-54.
21. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, section 8 (Vernon 1969) (repealed by Acts
1973, 63d Leg., p. 1458, ch. 543, section 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1974).
22. See TEX. CONST. art. I, section 3 ("All free men, when they form a social compact,
have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.").
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").

24. 424 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, no writ). In Gomez, an African American male sought to adopt his wife's two white daughters, but was prevented
from doing so at the district court level because of Texas law. The court cited to the thenrecent case of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in recognizing that the U.S. Supreme
Court considers any use of race in legislation highly suspect. See Gomez, 424 S.W.2d at
659. In Loving, Chief Justice Warren stated: "At the very least, the Equal Protection
Clause demands that racial classifications ...be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny."'
Loving, 388 U.S. at 18 (holding state legislation prohibiting interracial marriage a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment). Using this analysis, the court invalidated the law.
25. Almost five years after Gomez, a U.S. District Court in New Orleans struck down
a similar Louisiana statute in Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. La. 1972),
with the court stating:
When the advantages of family life in promoting personality development
and social adjustment are considered, the disadvantages of an interracial
adoption cannot be said to outweigh in all cases the advantages of a home
and family life to a child whose only alternatives are institutional life or fos-

1606

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

introduction of transracial adoption into Texas, it was quickly brought to
a halt as a result of the NABSW's position paper, and by 1973, the Child
Welfare League of America, an organization whose advice is closely followed by state agencies,26had changed its national guidelines on adoption
to favor race-matching.
B.

THE ADOPTION PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The adoption process is heavily divided along socioeconomic lines; this
is one of the reasons that minorities are less likely to be adopted. In
order to understand the distinction, I must first explain the three agencies
that prospective parents may work through when seeking to adopt a
child: (1) a public state agency, (2) a private state agency, or (3) an independent agency usually consisting of adoption attorneys. Public agencies
receive government funds to operate, and are subject to both state and
federal laws. 27 Private agencies are licensed by the state and receive
some form of federal and state funding. 28 Lastly, independent agencies
and adoption brokers facilitate the adoption process by matching children
with parents on a more personal level. 29 As a result of the fundamental
differences, each of the three agencies cater to different types of parents
and children.
Each of these agencies attempt to match children and parents based on
the child's needs, the financial situation of the parent(s), and the preference of the parent(s), among other factors. In addition, the agencies give
recommendation reports to the court for consideration when the process
reaches the second stage of a judicial proceeding. 30 Often, great weight is
given to agency findings in the courtroom.
Each of these agencies, however, is not governed by the MEPA. The
legislation only applies to governmental agencies and agencies that receive federal funds by prohibiting the improper use of race, color, or nater home care .... [the] statute making race the decisive factor in adoption
subordinates the child's best interests in some circumstances to racial discrimination. The statute thus promotes not the child's best interests but only
the integrity of race in the adoptive family relationship.
Id. at 267. See also Drummond, 547 F.2d at 850-51.
26. See GILL, supra note 3, at 2 ("[T]he Child Welfare League of America stat[ed] that
'it is preferable to place children in families of their own racial background.' One of the
reasons for this was that 'children placed in adoptive families with similar racial characteristics can become more easily integrated into the average family group and community."')
(citing Child Welfare League of America, Standardsfor Adoption Services 92 (1973)).

27. These units are typically child welfare agencies.
28. See Banks, supra note 6, at 897-98 (observing that both public and private adoption agencies are involved in a "more ongoing fashion" in the adoption process than are
their independent counterparts).
29. See id. at 898 ("Parents who pursue independent adoption are on the whole of
higher socioeconomic status and more likely to be white than parents who adopt through
the public system."); see also Bartholet, supra note 6, at 2355 (stating that two-thirds of all
adoptions take place in the "private agency and independent adoption worlds.").
30. See Banks, supra note 6, at 899. ("Thus, the judiciary customarily validates and
gives legal effect to the process and outcome that result from the agency's management of
the adoption process.").
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tional origin to deny or delay placements. 31 At least in the wholly private
sector, then, racial preference is still alive and very common.
C.

STRICT SCRUTINY FOR RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN EQUAL

PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Because of the great amount of weight given to adoption agency recommendations at the judicial level, it is imperative that these agencies
manage the process according to constitutional guidelines. As noted
above, the U.S. Supreme Court has devised levels of scrutiny for analysis
of cases under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to racial classifications, courts must conduct strict
scrutiny review, whereby the governmental interest must be "necessary,
compelling" and the means used to achieve the desired end must be "narrowly tailored. '32 The Supreme Court has typically rendered governmental practices and regulations dependent on race to be
unconstitutional, 3 3 even where the classification was intended to benefit
34
historically discriminated-against groups.

Why place benign racial classifications under a strict scrutiny review?
The Court in Croson finally agreed "that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local governments '

35

because "the standard of review . . .is not dependent on the

race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.

'36

Jus-

31. See Mabry, supra note 6, at 1350.
32. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (despite the Court's observation that "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious," wartime curfew aimed only at Japanese Americans found to be constitutional; however, the Court deferred to rational basis review); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (again, in spite of language stating that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect," the
Court reverted to Hirabayashiin holding anti-American Japanese legislation valid due to a
rational fear during wartime).
33. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 18; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking
down race-based state law prohibiting cohabitation by interracially married couples);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregation of children in public
schools based solely on race unconstitutional).
34. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (finding state-run medical school's remedial practice of holding spaces for minorities in admissions unconstitutional). In Bakke, Justice Powell noted that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color." Id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
35. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (explaining the holding of Croson). In Adarand, the
Court held unconstitutional a federal program designed to provide highway contracts to
disadvantaged minority subcontractors. Justice O'Connor, writing for the court, attempted
to dispel the notion that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"' in noting:
"[tjhe unhappy persistence of both the practice and lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and the government is
not disqualified from acting in response to it." Id. at 237.
36. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. In Croson, the city failed to show a compelling interest
in its plan to award 30% of subcontractor work to members of a "minority business enterprises" list. The Court noted that the plan's proponents did not show any identified past
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tice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in Croson, concluded:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society
the source of those effects, which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation
on the basis of
such as ours-to classify and judge men and women
37
their country of origin or the color of their skin.
D.

STRICT SCRUTINY

As

APPLIED IN THE CHILD CUSTODY

DISPUTE CONTEXT

The Court has released only one opinion related to race and custody:

Palmore v. Sidoti.38 But the opinion is at best ambiguous, and arguably
cannot even be applied to transracial adoption. In Palmore, a Caucasian
father sought to gain custody of his daughter from her biological mother
who was living with, and subsequently married, an African-American
man. A Florida trial court found that the child would be socially stigmatized if left in the custody of the racially-mixed couple "despite the strides
that have been made in bettering relations between the races in this country ....,"39 The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[t]he
goal of granting custody based on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. ' '40 In recognizing social pressures the child would face,
the Court found that the prejudices did not justify the use of racial classifications in deciding custody cases. But the Court only closed the door on
using those classifications when the result would be harm to the child; it
did not preclude the use of race generally. 41 "To date, the Palmore decision has been interpreted narrowly to apply only to parental custody disputes and, 2therefore, its impact in other circumstances [adoption] is
4
unknown."
One author has argued that Palmore does not apply to transracial
adoption for three reasons, making this a topic on which the Supreme
Court has declined to release an opinion.43 First, Palmore did not involve
adoption, but rather a custody dispute and the "Court did not, and has
not, extended its holding to adoption matters. '4 4 Second, no matter
which parent gained custody of the child in Palmore, the parent would be
both Caucasian and a biological parent, as opposed to transracial adoption, where the parent is of a different ethnicity and, necessarily, is not
discrimination to warrant remedial legislation of this type. In addition, the city did not
utilize any race-neutral means to try and remedy the alleged past discrimination. Id.
37. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
39. Id. at 431.
40. Id. at 433.
41. See Eubanks, supra note 6, at 1246.
42. Id. at 1246-47.
43. See Mabry, supra note 6, at 1386-88. But see Eubanks, supra note 6, at 1247 (reading the Court's decision more broadly to apply to placement cases, including adoption and
foster care).
44. Mabry, supra note 6, at 1387.
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biologically related. 45 Third, the Court did not rule that all racial classifications in custody proceedings were unconstitutional, "[n]either did it
preclude consideration of race 'as it relates to a child's heritage and which
parent is more prepared to expose the child to it."'46
Most lower courts confronted with the race-and-adoption question
have read Palmore to apply. 47 In fact, those courts have read Palmore to
say that the use of race in an adoption, foster care, or custody proceeding,
is constitutional as long as race is not the sole deciding factor in the
agency decision for child placement. These courts routinely use the "best
interests of the child" standard as the common rule in custody and adoption hearings. Under this standard, "[m]any professionals believe that
the crucial factor is that the child belongs in placement with an adult who
is the psychological parent and who will serve the best interests of the
48
child."
The D.C. Court of Appeals has described this standard as "not contain[ing] precise meaning" whose "lack of specificity is appropriate, however, 'given the multitude of varied factual situations which must be
embraced.. . . "',49 The same court added that the standard is not without
bounds: "[The standard] requires the judge, recognizing human frailty
and man's limitations with respect to forecasting the future course of
human events, to make an informed and rational judgment, free of bias
and favor, as to the least detrimental of the available alternatives." 50
Some factors that a court may include in determining the best interests
of a child are: psychological parentage; 51 continuity of care;52 the age of
the child; the stability of the adoptive family; financial and other resources available to the adopting family; special physical and emotional
45. See id.
46. Id. at 1387-88.
47. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1045-46 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809 (finding no violation of the Fourteen Amendment
due process clause when a lower court allowed a black family to adopt a black child over
the objections of a Caucasian foster family who previously had temporary custody and
wanted to adopt the child) (also referred to as Mauk v. Engle); Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F.
Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984): "so long
as racial considerations are not the sole reason for placement decisions, but only one of
several factors, they do not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause."); Reisman v. State
of Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 359 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) ("The simplest
application of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely applying actions of a state in a pure
colorblind manner is not always in the best interests of the child.").
48. SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 15.
49. In the Matter of the Petition of D.I.S. for the Adoption of S.A.O., 494 A.2d 1316,
1323 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing to In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
50. In the Matter of the Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d at 1322; see also Coles v. Coles, 204
A.2d 330, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (stating additional burdens placed on trial judges when
attempting to "promote the welfare of the child.").
51. "Psychological parenthood refers to the continuing day-to-day relationship that an
adult has with the child. This relationship fulfills a child's psychological needs for a parent
and meets his physical needs through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality." SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 15 (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

(1973)).

52. Continuity of care may play a role in the best interests of a child when that child
has been in foster care with the family seeking to adopt him or her.
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needs of the child; and blood relationships, if any, in addition to others. 53
Whether or not the Supreme Court intended to provide an ambiguous
answer is itself unclear, but because the Court left the door open to use of
race at least in custody proceedings, the MEPA legislation in 1994 was the
first federal action taken to remedy the traditional practice of race-matching in the adoption context. Even this step, however, did not provide a
solution because it still allowed race to be considered as one of many
factors.
III.

SHOULD THERE BE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION? THE
MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF 1994
AND ITS REPEAL
A.

OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

In 1996, as part of the American Bar Association's Conversation on
American Pluralism, Identity and Law, a group of people assembled in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, to discuss the topic of transracial/interracial
adoption. 54 Participants in the conversation were parents of adopted
children with varying cultural and ethnic backgrounds; they came together to promote transracial adoption as "a good and valuable thing, '5 5
as reported by Gail Leftwich:
Accompanying the unwavering commitment was the desire to deal
responsibly with the issues of identity and racial and cultural heritage, the appropriate resolution of which the parents viewed as one
of their chief obligations.
Thus, white parents talked of seeking integrated neighborhoods in
which to live and searching systematically for opportunities to allow
their adopted black child to interact with other black children and
adults, such as visits to black churches.
Parents of adopted children with different cultural backgrounds
described travel to foreign countries to expose their adopted child to
the relevant country of birth and collecting artifacts to have in the
home ....
Racism and bigotry were assumed to be the dominant realities
which would shape the adopted children's experiences in the world,
and their parents were driven to provide their children with the tools
the parents thought would prepare them to cope with the
56
consequences.
But an assumed lack of parental ability to deal with the racism and
bigotry that will inevitably face each of these children is exactly what
53. See generally Tallman, 859 F. Supp. at 1085-86 (citing Michigan Department of
Social Services guidelines for adoption evaluations); In Matter of the Petition of R.M.G.
and E.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding of trial court that these factors
contribute to the "paramount" concern of the best interests of the child).
54. See Gail Leftwich, TransracialAdoption: A Community Conversation, 12 Focus 1
(Fall 1996).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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groups like the NABSW are worried about. 57 Those opposed to transracial adoption, including some social workers and professionals, argue
that children suffer when they are raised by families from other5 cultures
8
unless extensive efforts are undertaken to help the child adjust.
In 1983, authors Owen Gill and Barbara Jackson published results from
a study on the effects of interracial adoption. They attempted to pinpoint
both the "black community" 59 and "experimental" 60 arguments against
the process, but found "little support for the criticisms of transracial
61
adoption ...

based on the anticipated difficulties of the child."

Arguments like these have also recently been dismissed as lacking a
causal element in the unhappiness of adopted children:
A common version of the argument that transracial adoption harms
children asserts that the children will develop malformed racial identities. Undeniably, some portion of transracially adopted children
may grow up to feel that their racial identity is lacking. Even worse,
they may trace various personal problems to their 'inadequate' racial
identity and their transracial family. The causal significance they attribute to their transracial family, however, might be more a reflection of where our society trains us to look for causes than of actual
causes. If the individual experienced the same problems but had
been adopted by a family of the same race, the racial character of the
family would probably not be viewed as a likely cause, even though
57. See NABSW POSITION PAPER, supra note 19; see also Susan Goldsmith, The Color
of Love, NEW TIMES Los ANGELES, April 30, 1998, Features section (citing testimony of
William Merritt, president of the NABSW, before the U.S. Senate in 1985: "'We view the
We
placement of black children in white homes as a hostile act against our community ....
are, therefore, legally justified in our efforts to protect the rights of black children, black
families, and the black community."').
58. See Kathy Barrett Carter, Foster Mother Claims DYFS Discourages Transracial
Adoptions: Agency Denies Skin Color a Factor in Decision, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
NJ), Apr. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3409128.
59. See GILL, supra note 3, at 4. "Black community" arguments are:
criticisms ... which see transracial adoption representing in microcosm the
oppression of black people in white society. These include: Blacks have always serviced whites. Now they are servicing them in the ultimate fashion,
by providing them with children; transracial adoption takes from the black
community its most valuable resource which is its children; [and] the black
community cannot hope to maintain its pride and dignity if advantage is defined as being brought up in white families.
Id.
60. See id. The second group of arguments is:
based on the anticipated experience of a black child in a white family, includ[ing] the following: because of the child's obvious difference of racial and
physical background the parents and other members of the family will come
to see the child as 'not belonging to this family.' Close and intimate family
relations will not develop between the child and other family members ...
[there] will be a deep sense of personal isolation .... Although over time,

racial background may be insignificant in the family, it will continue to be
crucially significant outside the family ....[And] [b]ecause the children are

black, but growing up in white families, they will not be taught the necessary
coping mechanisms for dealing with the hostility and rejection of white
society.
Id.
61. Id. at 131.
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issues of racial identity are present in same-race families. The causal
be a matter of interpretive salience rather than
inference, then, may
62
causal significance.
In an attempt to dispel the notions of ill-effects of transracial adoption
on children, renowned adoption scholar Dr. Rita J. Simon conducted 63a
twenty-year study on some 200 parents and their transracial adoptees.
The study involved sixty percent black children, with children of Korean
and Native American descent comprising the other forty percent. Simon
found no significant problems with the adoptees, apart from the usual
to personality, age, and gender
occurrences of bad behavior attributed
64
differences between the siblings.
Interviewers conducted tests, including "doll tests,"' 65 not only on the
adopted children, but also on their "birth children" siblings in an attempt
to gain information about the effects of having a brother or sister of a
different race. Additionally, the interviewers "gave the children... other
projective tests to assess attitudes, identities and awareness on the part of
both the adopted and birth children."'66 On the subject of racial awareness, Simon found the adoptees were comfortable with and aware of their
racial identity:
We reported conversations about race and racial issues over dinner,
watching the TV series "Roots," joining Black churches, seeking out
Black godparents, preparing Korean food, traveling to Native American festivals, and having lots of books, artifacts, music, etc. about
Blacks, Koreans, Native American, etc. cultures. As the years
progressed, it was the children, rather than the parents, who were
more likely to want to call a halt to these types of activities. "Not
every dinner conversation has to be a lesson in Black history," or
"we are more interested in basketball and football than in ceremofrom the
nial dances" were the comments we heard frequently
67
[transracial adoptees] as they were growing up.
Simon and fellow researchers concluded the letter with the following
plea: "[M]ove the thousands of children who are available for adoption
out of institutions and out of temporary foster placements into permanent homes. Make the move without regard to race. Apply the standard
'best interests of the child' as the first and foremost criterion in child
62. Banks, supra note 6, at 948-49 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
63. See Examining Barriersto Adoption of Children, 1993: Hearingson S. 1224 Before
the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 103rd Cong. 98 (1993) (publication by Rita J. Simon, legal and
sociology scholar) [hereinafter Simon]. The study lasted from 1971 to 1991, comprising
four total contacts with the families throughout the interviewing years. "At each phase of
the study, we reported the problems, setbacks, and disappointments, as well as the successes, the joys and the optimism about the future." Id. at 98.
64. See id. at 101.
65. See id. at 100. As a method of testing the children's awareness of racial identity,
each was given the opportunity to select black, white, and "in between dolls" at random
when playing. The researchers found that unlike all other doll tests done in the past, the
children did not favor the white doll. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 98.
67. Simon, supra note 63, at 100.
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placement. '68
The struggle to reconcile race and "the best interests of the child" has
had marked effects on the success of transracial adoption; there are at
least 107,000 of the 507,000 children currently in foster care awaiting
adoption. 69 Children wait an average of two-and-a-half years to be
adopted, and according to federal statistics, minority children spend twice
as long as whites in foster care. 70 The Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994
was intended to aid in the adoption of minority children, but had little
success because the race factor could still be used in placement decisions.
B.

THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF

1994

In 1994, Congress passed the Multiethnic Placement Act. 71 The MEPA
denied an agency or entity that received federal funds the ability to use
race as the sole factor in denying any person the opportunity to become
an adoptive or foster parent. But an agency could use race as one of the
factors in making placement decisions. The Act stated:
Prohibition
An agency, or entity, that receives Federal assistance and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may notcategorically deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, or the child, involved; or
delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster
care, or otherwise discriminate in making a placement decision,
solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.
Permissible Consideration
An agency or entity to which paragraph (1) applies may consider
the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the child and the capacity of the prospective foster or adoptive parents to meet the needs of
a child of this background as one of
number of factors used to deter72
mine the best interests of a child.
The main goals of the 1994 Act were to shorten an adoptive child's wait
for placement, to prevent denial of the opportunity to become a foster or
adoptive parent based solely on race, and to diligently recruit culturally
diverse and minority adoptive and foster families. 73 According to the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"):
68. Id. at 102.
69. Statistics provided by the Child Welfare League of America (1996).
70. See id.
71. See MEPA, supra note 5.
72. Id. at (a)(1)(A)-(B).
73. See McLaughlin, supranote 3, at 531; Office for Civil Rights of the Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., Memorandum from Dennis Hayashi on Policy Guidance on the Use of
Race, Color or National Origin as Considerationsin Adoption and Foster Care Placements
(Apr. 20, 1995) (found in HHS database at <http://www.hhs.gov>) [hereinafter Policy
Guidance].
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[The] MEPA permits an agency to consider both a child's cultural,
racial, and ethnic background and the capacity of the foster or adoptive parents to meet the needs of a child of a specific background, as
one of a number of factors used
in determining whether a placement
74
is in the child's best interests.
But, "this factor must ... be applied on an individualized basis, not by
general rules."75 In particular, the MEPA was designed to aid in the
adoption and placement of children who are harder to place, namely minority children.76 In order to further MEPA goals, the mandate was
funded: "Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, the federal government will match 75% of any state funds used to train staff or foster and
adoptive parents; the federal government will match 50% of state admin77
istrative funds used for recruitment and child placement activities.
C.

APRIL

1994 HHS POLICY GUIDANCE

Shortly after the passage of the MEPA, HHS provided extensive guidance to agencies in order to assist them in complying with both Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 196478 and the MEPA. 79 The guidance provided
that an agency receiving federal financial assistance could consider race,
color, or national origin when making placements only if the agency made
a "narrowly tailored, individualized determination that the facts and circumstances of a particular case require[d] the consideration of race,
color, or national origin in order to advance the best interests of the child
in need of placement."8 0
Recognizing that standards for foster care and adoption are generally
matters of state law and policy, HHS highlighted state practices that were
in violation of the new law, including:
Establish time periods during which only a same race/ethnicity
search will occur;
74. Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Servs., The Multiethnic
Placement Sheet (MEPA)-Fact Sheet (last modified July 17, 1998) <http://www.os.dhhs.
gov/progorg/ocr/mepafact.html>.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2002d (West 1994) (prohibiting recipients of Federal financial assistance from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin in their programs and
activities, and from operating their programs in ways that have the effect of discriminating
on the basis of those factors). Actual Language: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id.
79. MEPA, supra note 5.
80. Policy Guidance, supra note 73. As part of the individualized decision-making
process, other child-related factors often considered are: the child's current functioning
and behaviors; medical, educational and developmental needs; history and past experience;
and attachment to current caretakers. See id. When assessing a prospective parent's ability (and suitability) to care for a child, some factors include: the ability to help the child
integrate into the family; ability to accept the behavior and personality of the specific child;
and the ability to validate the child's cultural, racial, and ethnic background. See id.
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Establish orders of placement preferences based on race, culture, or
ethnicity;
Require caseworkers to specially justify transracial placements; or
[Those practices which] [o]therwise have the effect of delaying placein order
ments, either before or after termination of parental rights,
81
to find a family of a particular race, culture, or ethnicity.
In addition, HHS set forth a number of methods that agencies were
encouraged to utilize in order to develop an adequate pool of families
capable of promoting each child's development and case goals. Those
methods included both general and targeted recruiting through use of the
general media and community organizations, such as religious institutions
and neighborhood centers. HHS suggested that all agencies have a "comprehensive recruitment plan" that included:
A description of the characteristics of waiting children;
Specific strategies to reach all parts of the community;
Diverse methods of disseminating both general and child specific
information;
Strategies for assuring that all prospective parents have access to the
home study process, including location and hours of services that facilitate access by all members of the community;
Strategies for training staff to work with diverse cultural, racial, and
economic communities;
Strategies for dealing with linguistic barriers;
Non-discriminatory fee structures; and
Procedures for a timely search for prospective parents for a waiting
child, including the use of exchanges and other interagency efforts,
provided that such procedures must insure that placement of a child
in an appropriate household is not delayed by the search for a same
race or ethnic placement.
Agencies receiving Federal funds may not use standards related to
income, age, education, family structure, and size or ownership of
housing, which exclude groups of prospective parents on the basis of
or
race, color or national origin, where those standards are arbitrary
82
unnecessary or where less exclusionary standards are available.
Not less than two year after HHS released this guidance, supporters of
the MEPA were disappointed to realize that the legislation did not have
81. Id.
Some states specify an order of preference for placements, which make
placement in a family of the same race, culture, or ethnicity as the child a
preferred category. Some states prescribe set periods of time in which agencies must try to place a child with a family of the same race, culture, or
ethnicity before the children can be placed with a family of a different race,
culture, or ethnicity . . . . And some states indicate that children should be
placed with families of the same race or ethnicity provided that this is consistent with the best interests of the child.
82. Id.
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the intended effect of speeding up the adoption process for minority children. In part, it was the practices of state agencies that impeded MEPA
progress:
These agencies had been using race in a systematic way to categorize
waiting children and prospective parents, and to make matching decisions in the foster and adoption placement process. Race matching
had been one of the most important decision-making criteria. It had
been considered so important that children had been regularly held
in foster or institutional care, rather than placed in adoptive homes,
simply because same-race matches were unavailable, even though social workers knew that delay and denial of adoptive homes were
likely to do children serious damage. Race had outweighed virtually
all other parental fitness factors, and social workers had drastically
altered their traditional selection criteria for minority race adopters,
in their desperation
to find same-race matches for the waiting black
83
children.
It seemed that the only way to remedy the situation would be to exclude the race factor all together. As discussed below, however, even the
"routine" exclusion of race in subsequent MEPA amendments has not
helped the situation.
IV.

THE 1996 LEGISLATION: "REMOVAL OF BARRIERS TO
INTERETHNIC ADOPTION" AND 1997-98 HHS OFFICE
OF CIVIL RIGHTS GUIDANCE
A. MEPA-IEP

In August 1996, President Clinton signed the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, including section 1808 of the Act entitled "Removal
of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption" ("IEP"). 84 It repealed section 553
of the original MEPA, cutting "Permissible Consideration" out, and
changing the language as shown:
A person or government that is involved in adoption or foster care
placements may not - (a) [categorically] deny to any individual the
opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, [solely] on the
basis of race, color, or national origin of the individual, or of the
83. PreparedStatement of Elizabeth Bartholet Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources, Subject-Hearingon Implementation of the
1996 Interethnic Adoption Amendments to the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE,

Sept. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, In the News [hereinafter

Bartholet, Statement).
84. Labeled as Interethnic Adoption Provisions, the MEPA amendments were part of
President Clinton's and the HHS Administration for Children and Families' Adoption 2002
plan. The stated goal is to double the number of children adopted or placed in other
homes by the year 2002. See Department of Health and Human Services, Executive Summary (last modified Feb. 18, 1997) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/special/2002
body.htm> (outlining the Adoption 2002 program which focuses special attention "on a
special group of children waiting to be adopted-the approximately 100,000 children in the
public foster care system who cannot return safely to their own parents and homes." It was
published in response to a Presidential directive issued Dec. 14, 1996, requesting an HHS
report on actions to be taken "to move children more rapidly from foster care to permanent homes .... ) [hereinafter Executive Summary].
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child involved; or (b) delay or deny the placement of a child for
adoption or into foster care [or otherwise discriminate in making a
placement decision, solely] on the basis of race, color, or national
85
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved.
Policy guidance to the Office of Civil Rights staff notes that the effect
of striking the language shown above "is to clarify that it is not just categorical bans against transracial placements that are prohibited. ' 86 Instead, "these changes clarify that even where a denial is not based on a
categorical consideration, which is prohibited, other actions that delay or
deny placements on the basis of race, color or national origin are
87
prohibited."
In line with the stated goals of the original MEPA, 88 Congress did retain section 554, requiring "diligent recruitment of potential foster and
adoptive families that reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of children in
the State for whom foster and adoptive homes are needed." 8 9
In addition to the noted language changes, the section imposes penalties on both States and adoption agencies that are non-compliant with the
provisions. 90 In cases where an immediate corrective action plan fails to
remedy a problem stemming from noncompliance, the agency or state
involved will be subject to "specific graduated financial penalties" as determined by HHS officials. 91 Penalties imposed "vary according to the
'92
State population and the frequency and duration of noncompliance.
85. Memorandum from Dennis Hayahshi on Interethnic Adoption Provisions of the
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (June 4, 1997) (available in <http://www.hhs.
gov/cgi-bin>) [hereinafter Hayashi, Memorandum].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. The memorandum focuses on the
importance of four critical elements: 1) Delays in placing children who need
adoptive or foster homes are not to be tolerated, nor are denials based on
any prohibited or otherwise inappropriate consideration; 2) Discrimination is
not to be tolerated, whether it is directed toward adults who wish to serve as
foster or adoptive parents, toward children who need safe and appropriate
homes, or toward communities or populations which may heretofore have
been underutilized as a resource for placing children; 3) Active, diligent, and
lawful recruitment of potential foster and adoptive parents of all backgrounds is both a legal requirement and an important tool for meeting the
demands of good practice; and 4) The operative standard in foster care or
adoptive placements had been and continues to be 'the best interests of the
child.' Nevertheless.... any consideration of race, color or national origin...
must be narrowly tailored to advance the child's best interest and must be
made as an individualized determination of each child's needs and in light of
a specific prospective adoptive or foster care parent's capacity to care for
that child.
Id.
89. Id.
90. See Hayashi, Memorandum, supra note 85. This "State Plan" requirement will
force HHS Office for Civil Rights officials to form a "common protocol for determining
compliance with these ... provisions .... developing corrective action plans and imposing
penalties." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. "[HHS] has estimated that State penalties could range from less than $1,000 to
more than $3.6 million per quarter, and penalties for continued noncompliance could rise
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POINTING OUT

THE LOOPHOLES

As of November 1997, almost three months after passage of the
amendments, HHS had not yet notified states of the change in the federal
law, even though the amendments were effective immediately.93 In the
nine months after passage, HHS slowly released policy compliance guidance to states and Title IV-E agencies regarding formal changes to the
MEPA (in the form of language changes shown above, for example). In
addition, HHS began drafting what it termed "strong" guidance, promising to issue "model guidelines for State legislation to emphasize that the
child's health and safety is the paramount concern in decisions to termi'94
nate parental rights."

The "strong" guidance released, however, bore a striking resemblance
to its predecessor, and failed to answer practical questions for state agencies trying to understand the amendments and avoid penalties for noncompliance. It was only after complaints from state, county, and local
caseworkers that HHS released valuable and realistic information to
adoption and child welfare agencies. This guidance, finally released in
May 1998, is currently available to agencies in question-and-answer
format.

95

The 1997 and 1998 practical guidance is repetitive and once again promotes the "best interest of the child" standard 96 without making
casework specific examples available to states' agency staff. Unfortunately, both Congress and HHS have effectively failed to close the loopholes that frustrated the success of the MEPA the first time around.
What Congress hoped to remedy with the MEPA-IEP is clear-to end
the use of race in adoption placement decisions. What Congress really
as high as $7 million to $10 million in some States." Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-279, at
6 (1996) (explaining that "Section 474 of the Social Security Act is amended to require the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ('HHS') to reduce the amount of Federal foster
care and adoption funds provided to the State through Title IV-E if the State program is
found in violation of this provision .... States found to be in violation will have their
quarterly funds reduced by 2 percent for the first violation, by 5 percent for the second
violation, and by 10 percent for the third or subsequent violation.").
93. See PreparedStatement of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director, Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, United States General Accounting
Office, Before the House Committee on Ways and Means Subommittee on Human Resources, Subject-Challenges Faced In Implementing the Multiethnic Placement Act, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, In the News.

94. Executive Summary, supra note 84.
95. See Answers, supra note 3. In January 2000, DHHS released a Final Rule to accompany the Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
See Final Rule, supra note 5. This Final Rule briefly discussed DHHS guidance relating to
the MEPA-IEP: "We recommend that the State or entity review Federal policy guidance
already issued on the MEPA, as amended by the IEP (found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs/cb/). Additionally, both the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and ACF Regional
Offices stand ready to provide guidance to any State with a specific policy question." Id. at
4046.
96. Note that the "best interests of the child" standard will always be a compelling
interest, allowing adoption agencies to continue race-matching and jump the hurdle of strict
scrutiny.
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did was pass an amendment, followed by little government action to ensure its healthy implementation. HHS guidance issued after passage of
the 1996 MEPA-IEP states that "the amendments remove potentially
misleading language in MEPA's original provisions and clarify that 'discrimination is not to be tolerated,' whether directed at children in need of
appropriate, safe homes, at prospective parents, or at previously 'underutilized' communities who could not be resources for placing children."' 97 This strong language, however, is severely undercut by the same
guidance stating that "any decision to consider the use of race as a necessary element of a placement decision must be based on concerns arising
out of the circumstances of the individual case."' 98 In effect, HHS is saying that although states and adoption agencies are prohibited from using
race as a factor in placement decisions on a routine basis, it really would
not violate federal law to do so in some "narrow and exceptional circumstances arising out of the specific needs of an individual child." 9 9 This
loophole is just one of the means by which adoption agencies continue
the practice of race-matching despite Congressional efforts to transform
the adoption world into a colorblind system.
1. Individual Assessments and Preferences as Loopholes
HHS guidance repeatedly states that "[p]ublic agencies may not routinely consider race, national origin and ethnicity in making placement
decisions" and "[a]ny consideration of these factors must be done on an
individualized basis where special circumstances indicate that their consideration is warranted." 10 0 But, while agencies may not rely on generalizations about a child's race, they are "not prohibited from discussing
with prospective adoptive ... parents their feelings, capacities and preferences regarding caring for a child of a particular race or ethnicity."10 1 The
amendments, according to guidance, allow an "individual assessment" of
both the child and a prospective parent's ability to serve that child. While
that "assessment function must not be misused as a generalized racial or
ethnic screen," won't agencies always use this assessment as a way to fac10 2
tor race into the mix?
For example, a caseworker could cite the individual assessment as a
means through which race can be used, because it is in the "best interests
of the child." The agency would not be using generalizations, but would
focus on the particular child and use race despite the prohibition. Further, that parents may cite "preferences" in discussions with agency employees highlights the fact that race will still be used to filter children
97. Professor Joan Heifetz Hollinger & ABA Center on Children and the Law, A
Guide to the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 As Amended by the Interethnic Adoption
Provisions of 1996 (visited Jan. 17, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/child/mepa.txt>.
98. Hayashi, Memorandum, supra note 85.
99. Hollinger, supra note 97.
100. Answers, supra note 3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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though the adoption placement process. This loophole will increase the
amount of litigation wherein plaintiffs must bear the burden of proving
that either race, national origin, or ethnicity was illegally used in a placement decision; the easy defense will be that the use of race was not "routine," but that the agency's employee was ensuring the best interests of
the child.
2. Permissible Use of Culture
Another loophole in the amendment is the absence of the word "culture." 10 3 HHS guidance states that "[t]here are situations where cultural
needs may be important in placement decisions," but that "a public
agency's consideration of culture would raise Section 1808 issues if the
agency used culture as a proxy for race, color or national origin. '10 4 This
may seem to be a strong warning to agencies that the use of "cultural
competency" is not to be a pretext. However, later in the guidance, the
strength of the prohibition is significantly lessened by HHS:
The term 'cultural competency,' as we understand it, is not one that
would fit in a discussion of adoption ....However, agencies should,
as a matter of good social work practice, examine all the factors that
may bear on determining whether a particular placement is in the
best interests of a particular child. That may in rare instances involve
consideration of the abilities of prospective parents of one race or
ethnicity to care for a child of another race or ethnicity.10 5
In stating that the term "'cultural competency' . . . is not one that
would fit in the discussion of adoption," HHS is ignoring, or at least skirting, an important issue: that the term "cultural competency" has in fact
become a pretext for delaying the placement of children, and a substitute
for the term "race-matching." Despite the fact that culture cannot be
used as a "proxy" for impermissible considerations, state agencies will
view the HHS guidance a green light for its use-when deemed in the
best interest of the child. "The belief that race or cultural heritage is
central to a child's best interests when making a placement is so inherent
in social work theory and practice that a policy statement of the National
Association of0 6Social Workers still reflects this tenet, despite changes in
1
federal law."
3.

The Meaning of Delay or Denial

The MEPA-IEP confirms that any delay in placement based on impermissible factors is illegal. HHS guidance, however, provides examples of
what is meant by delay or denial in the foster care context only; examples
103. This seems to beg the question: Are the concepts of "culture" and "ethnicity"
mutually exclusive?
104. Answers, supra note 3 (providing as an example a situation "where a child has
specific language needs.").
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Nadel, supra note 93.
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of adoption delays or denials are absent. 10 7 Obviously, while these practical examples will help state agencies understand casework specific treatment for foster care, the lack of examples in the adoption context does
not allow those agencies to understand the practical workings of the
MEPA-IEP. Why HHS chose not to provide examples on adoption delays or denials (in the context of the amendments) is unknown, but the
absence is unmistakable.
To determine if it is in violation of delaying or denying an adoption
based on prohibited factors, a state agency will have to look to earlier
1995 guidance released by HHS. To start, the practice of "holding periods," (keeping a child in agency custody while looking for same-race
adoptive parents), is federally prohibited.1 08 Similarly, an agency may
not delay placing a child in an available home because of race.10 9 An
agency may conduct a search for adoptive parents to fulfill a child's placement needs, but that search cannot, and should not, "be limited to samerace prospective parents except in those rare circumstances where the
child has a specific and demonstrable need for a same-race placement."1 10 Once again, "specific need" is the loophole.
4.

Other Factors

Delay in the adoption placement context is not only a result of using
impermissible factors, such as race. In fact, many other social and procedural factors contribute to delays within the child welfare system. Procedurally, for example, high caseloads in state agencies continue to impede
the completion of individualized assessments of children awaiting adoption.1 1 There are also significant court delays in scheduling mandatory
review or termination hearings.112 Social factors include the "distinctive
physical and emotional needs of children who have been abused or ne107. See Answers, supra note 3. The following are a few examples of what would constitute a delay or denial in the foster care context:
1) A white newborn baby's foster placement is delayed because the social
worker is unable to find a white foster home; the infant is kept in the hospital
longer than would otherwise be necessary and is ultimately placed in a group
home rather than being placed in a foster home with a minority family; 2) A
minority relative with guardianship over four black children expressly requests that the children be allowed to remain in the care of a white neighbor
in whose care the children are left. The state agency denies the white neighbor a restricted foster care license which will enable her to care for the children. The agency's license denial is based on its decision that the best
interests of the children require a same-race placement, which will delay the
permanent foster care placement. There was no individualized assessment or
evaluation indicating that a same-race placement is actually in the best interests of the children ... [and] 4) Different standards may be applied in licensing white versus minority households resulting in delay or denial of the
opportunity to be foster parents.
Id.
108. See Policy Guidance, supra note 73.
109. See id.
110. Hollinger, supra note 97.
111. Id.
112. See id.
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glected which . . .make it difficult to secure appropriate out-of-home
care," incorrect information about the availability of medical assistance
for adoptive children, and "cultural norms that are hostile to formal
13
adoption."1
Each of these factors, in addition to the loopholes discussed above,
works to frustrate successful implementation of the MEPA-IEP.
Granted, there will always be situations in which the loopholes are legally
used, and delays can occur on many levels for various reasons. Illegal use
of the loopholes, however, will go virtually undetected, hidden by the veil
of "culture" or "individual assessment" or "the child's best interest." In
addition, ineffective management of the adoption process will continue to
promote delays for the placement of thousands of children whose natural
parents' rights have been terminated. To reduce delays in the courts and
at the state levels, active efforts to oversee the correct implementation of
the amendments is imperative.
V.

TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND
MEANS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITEE ON HUMAN
RESOURCES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESSEPTEMBER 15, 1998

In September 1998, several renowned adoption scholars and members
of government agencies met with the House Subcommittee on Human
Resources to discuss the effects of MEPA-IEP on the social welfare system. The testimony centered primarily on the current state of adoption
placements, lack of HHS guidance following passage of the amendments,
and, generally, the failure of federal legislation to remedy the on-going
practices of race-matching. The following are brief synopses of some
statements presented by various individuals on the state of adoption in
late 1998.
In his testimony to the Subcommittee, Associate Director of the Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division
of the United States General Accounting Office Mark V. Nadel commented on HHS actions taken in the nine months following MEPA-IEP
passage.1 14 As it had in 1994, HHS notified state agencies of the amendments and stated the revised policy guidance would follow. In addition,
the Department provided technical assistance to the states, including re115
views of agency placement practices in selected locations.
113. Id. But see PreparedStatement of Richard P. Barth, Ph.D., Frank A. Daniels Professor, School of Social Work, The University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill, Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human Resources, Subject-Research Regarding the Multi-Ethnic PlacementAct and Amendments, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, In the News ("My research and experience
tell me that there is considerably more acceptance of interethnic and cross-racial placements among the general public than among the professional adoption community.").
114. See Nadel, supra note 93.
115. Id.
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HHS did not, however, take these much needed measures until well
after the amendments were enacted, and further, decided it was not necessary to repeat certain assistance activities. "For example, it did not repeat the outreach and training to state officials, nor [did] it [update] the
116
monograph on the act to include information on the amendment."
Additionally, HHS officials told state and federal agencies that it was
"not necessary to conduct another comprehensive review of state statutes
1' 17
because they said they would work with states on a case-by-case basis.
Concerned about the continuing practices of race-matching on the state
level, adoption scholar Elizabeth Bartholet noted that is not evident that
"MEPA II has had a significant impact to date, or that it will have a significant impact without vigorous enforcement action on the part of the
federal government."1 1 8 In reference to HHS's "tough-sounding Guidance," Bartholet noted that there has been little activity following what
she termed "problematic" legislation prohibiting actions that are "blatantly illegal": 119
The U.S. Department of HHS, responsible for administrative enforcement, has been awfully quiet ....

State officials responsible for

bringing their agencies into compliance with MEPA are similarly
quiet. Listening to the sounds of child welfare activity coming from
around the country one gets no sense that the revolutionary change
called for by MEPA is in the works. There is instead a deafening
silence. All seems to be going more of less as usual ....

The 1997

Guidance was a start on the job that needed to be done, but there
has been no adequate follow-up activity. The problem seems to be
are, for the most
that those in charge of enforcement and compliance
120
part, believers in the tradition of race matching.
Bartholet also addressed concerns about the use of "cultural competency" and "kinship care" which "function as convenient endruns around
the new MEPA mandate.'' 1 In response to an essay written by another
adoption scholar, R. Richard Banks, 122 Bartholet scoffed at Banks' proposition that "the nature of the current debate 'virtually guarantees a
move away from race matching'":
Would that were it so .... [T]here is enormous resistance to this law,
and it appears so far to have had little impact. State social service
agencies tend to be committed from top to bottom to their racematching ways. Private foundations and nonprofit child welfare
groups have joined forces with public agencies to promote 'kinship
care' in part to help ensure that children in need of homes remain
within their racial group. 'Cultural competence' is one of the code
phrases in the post-MEPA era for assessing whether agencies remain
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Bartholet, Statement, supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Banks, supra note 6.
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sufficiently committed to same-race matching and whether they are
doing enough 123
to recruit families of color to make same-race placement possible.
Harvard Law School Professor Randall Kennedy echoed Batholet's
concerns about both "cultural competence" and general state agency "recalcitrance" serving as "pretexts that camouflage racial decision-making." 12 4 Very effectively, Kennedy revealed the inherent problems
associated with using "cultural competency" as a consideration in the
adoption placement context:
For one thing, [the notion of cultural competency] puts officials in
the position of attempting to prescribe 'racial correctness.' Fortunately, there exists no authoritative criterion by which to measure
what sorts of ideas or conduct can certifiably be deemed properly
'black' (or 'white' or 'yellow' etc.). African Americans (like the individuals constituting all groups in American society) vary tremendously. Many like gospel music or rap. Many do not. Many
celebrate Kwanza. Many do not. Many live predominantly in black
neighborhoods. Some do not. Many are Christians. Many are Moslems. The idea that public or private welfare officials would homogenize the varied African American community and impose that
homogenized stereotype upon white adults seeking to provide
chil12 5
dren with adoptive homes ... is a frightening prospect.
Finally, Dr. Richard P. Barth, a professor in the School of Social Work
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, described research
which continues to show the desperate need to move children out of
America's foster care system into permanent homes. 126 Barth advocates
creation of a more comprehensive adoption services research program
and a broader approach of "engaging a far larger proportion of the
American public in welcoming foster and adoptive children of all types
into their homes":
This challenge is growing greater every day as we are becoming an
America where every adult is working outside the home; where family size is.
dropping; understanding and misunderstanding about the
contribution of genetics and pre-natal environments are making
adoptive parents more wary; where reproductive technologies are
promising more alternatives to adoption; and the cost of raising a
127
child is soaring.
These statements are encouraging in the fact that members of the academic community recognize that MEPA is in danger, but it will take
much more than mere discussion to successfully implement the legislation, achieving the desired results.
123. Bartholet, supra note 6.
124. PreparedStatement of Randall Kennedy, Professor, Harvard Law School, Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human Resources, FEDERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, In the News.
125. Id.
126. See Barth, supra note 113.
127. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Too quick to criticize? You bet, and that is the wall that legislators and
advocates of this amendment continue to hit. No matter how you slice it,
buzzwords like "cultural competency" and "kinship care" have simply become the current versions of race-matching. The removal of the "Permissible Consideration" language in the amendments does little in fact to
prevent the consideration of race; it is too important in the intimate family context to ignore, and it is too ingrained in the minds of social workers
who have seen first-hand the repercussions of bad placements, and the
damaging effects of non-placements. In addition, the "best interests of
the child" standard is the proverbial "compelling reason," and will forever be used to justify a same-race match based upon an individualized
assessment of a child and the prospective parents who wish to adopt him
or her.
Thus, simply trying to take race out of the adoption equation is not
going to decrease the number of children that continue to enter into and
remain the America's child welfare system. Passing an amendment without requisite guidance is not going to do the job either. It is going to take
active management on the state level, community education and outreach
programs, aggressive recruitment of adoptive parents, and most importantly, judicial compliance.
Naturally, one would think that judicial compliance would be the predominant means of thoroughly implementing the legislation. Surprisingly, though, this was not the case in an Illinois court in early March of
1999. With news that rekindled the transracial adoption debate, the Associated Press reported that a "black former cocaine addict won her battle against a politically powerful white couple for custody of her 3-yearold son Monday in a case that raised questions of race, influence and
drugs. '128 The "Baby T" case, as it has been labeled by the media, began
in Fall 1998 when white foster parents, the Burkes, attempted to adopt an
African-American child and have his mother, Tina Olison, declared unfit.
On March 8, 1999, suburban Kane County Judge Judith Brawka, selected to decide the case because of its heavy political overtones in Chicago, found that "child-welfare experts placed too little emphasis on
black culture when they recommended that the black youngster remain
with the city Alderman Edward Burke and his wife, state Appellate
Judge Anne Burke. 1 29 The couple had cared for the 3-year-old child
since he was 8 days old.
Noting that the mother was now drug free, and citing state law that
favors placement of children with their biological parents, Judge Brawka
ordered a 12-month conditional transition period in which the child will
be returned to his biological mother.
128. Mike Robinson, Ex-addict Gets Her Son Back From Politicians, THE INDIANAPOMar. 9, 1999, at A3. Mr. Burke is a city alderman and Mrs. Burke is a state
appellate judge. See id.
129. Id.
LIS STAR,
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Judge Brawka's finding, however, that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services erred in putting too little emphasis on the importance of black culture 130 in Baby T's upbringing is just what the
MEPA-IEP is designed to do-it forbids any emphasis. In fact, Federal
officials announced a week after the ruling that they are investigating
whether Judge Brawka broke the law.
One should commend HHS officials who are stepping in to investigate
the decision, but at the same time, the thought of how many other unpublicized cases are being decided in violation of the MEPA-IEP comes to
mind. During the "Baby T" trial, a licensed clinical social worker,
Samella Abdullah, testifying on behalf of the mother, said that the couple
"'cannot provide for his cultural needs.""31 If that is not consideration
of race, I do not know what is. Is it in the best interests of the child?
Maybe. But maybe not. Like the judge said, "He will not be three
1
forever. " 132
So, although race as a factor has literally been taken out of the statute,
it still plays a major role in the process, practically speaking. Race cannot
be taken out of the equation, and until societal views and state practices
are changed, it never will be. And while identifying the problem may
seem easy, the answer is more difficult to find. The search for it must
begin with reviews of state agency practices and a hope that the tradition
of race-matching can be eliminated sooner rather than later.

130. In her ruling, Judge Brawka said, "unless the position of the department is that
there is no such thing as African-American culture, this issue deserves more attention than
to check a box that says, 'not applicable."' Mike Robinson, Cutlure Trumps Power in a
Chicago Custody Case, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9,1999, at National/Foreign, A3.
131. Dennis Byrne, Editorial, End Racial Loophole, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10,
1999, at 41.
132. Daniel J. Lehmann, Baby T Ruling Gets Federal Attention, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1999, at News, 8.

